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Merchants on the Margins: 
Fifteenth-Century Bruges and the Informal Market1 
 
 
 
 
‘For Flaundres is staple, as men tell me, to alle nacyons of Crystiante’ 
 
In 1436-37, one of the most evocative of Middle English political poems, the Libelle of 
Englyshe Polycye, was written. Convinced that the command of the sea was the key to his 
country’s pre-eminence, the anonymous author expounded an almost mercantilist policy 
aimed at ensuring England’s economic supremacy. In his opinion, the most important threat to 
English commercial interests was to be found in Flanders, on the other side of the Channel. 
This was not because Flanders was blessed with fertile soil or thriving industries: on the 
contrary. Writing from a jingoistic perspective at a time when Anglo-Flemish tensions ran 
high, he conveniently ignored the exceptional diversity of luxury and refining industries that 
did not serve his propagandist purposes and pontificated that the county itself had little to 
offer apart from ‘a lytell madere and Flemmyshe cloothe’. The secret of Flanders’ success, 
however, was the role of Bruges, one of its main cities, as a staple market for other regions. 
This staple function induced merchants from all parts of Europe to bring their goods to the 
county, giving it the economic edge that England lacked.
2
 
 
More comprehensive than staple provisions in force in most other hubs of international trade 
in Western Europe,
3
 Bruges’ regulations stipulated that most merchandise entering Flanders 
                                                 
1
 Abbreviations used: ADN for ‘Lille, Archives Départementales du Nord’ and SAB for ‘Bruges, Stadsarchief 
Brugge’. 
2
The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: a poem on the use of sea-power, 1436, ed. G.F. Warner (Oxford, 1926). On 
the Libelle’s historical context, see G.A. Holmes, ‘The “Libel” of English Policy’, The English Historical 
Review, 76 (1961), 193-216. On political tract writing in late medieval England, see J.P. Genet, Four English 
political tracts of the later middle ages (London, 1977), ix-xix. C. Taylor, ‘War, Propaganda and Diplomacy in 
Fifteenth-Century France and England’, in: War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France, ed. C. 
Allmand (Liverpool, 2000), 70-91. For other English political poems written at the time of the Libelle’s creation, 
see Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth Centuries, ed. R.H. Robbins (New York, 1959), 78-89. 
3
 The towns established as domestic staple ports by the Statute of the Staple in England in 1353 and the 
continental staple set up in Calais in 1363 only acted as depots for wool, wool-fells, leather and lead. T.H. Lloyd, 
The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1977), 207-224. W.M. Ormrod, The Reign of Edward 
III (Charleston, 2000),  176-179.The Dordrecht staple restrictions covered all merchandise transported on the 
rivers Waal, Lower Rhine/Lek and Meuse but in essence applied to Rhenish wine, grain, wood and salt. J. 
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on the Zwin, its waterway giving access to the sea, had to be transported to and sold in the 
city. At the end of the thirteenth century Bruges was already acting as a compulsory depot, 
due to the privileges granted by the counts of Flanders to foreign merchants and several toll 
rights enjoyed by Bruges’ citizens. Only in 1323, after various attempts by the counts of 
Flanders to curtail the city’s staple rights, a more far-reaching privilege was granted, making 
the staple obligatory and exclusive. Exceptions were made for herring, leather, ash, butter, 
horses, cattle and all commodities packed in barrels, particularly wine, which could be 
unloaded in the outport of Damme. In Hoeke and Monnikerede, merchants were allowed to 
sell corn, dried fish, skins and everything needed for rigging boats.
4
 
 
 
Illustration 1: Bruges and the Zwin Estuary in the late medieval period 
 
Most Zwin ports owed their development to their status as Bruges’ satellite towns5 and wisely 
accepted their subordination into the staple network.
6
 More resistance was met in Sluys, held 
                                                                                                                                                        
Dijkman, Shaping Medieval Markets. The Organisation of Commodity Markets in Holland, c. 1200-1450 
(Leyden, 2011), 159-198.  Further upstream, all goods passing down the Lower Rhine, most notably wine, had to 
be unloaded in Cologne. O. Gönnenwein, Stapel- und Niederlagsrecht (Weimar, 1939), 97 ff. B. Kuske, ‘Der 
Kölner Stapel und seine Zusammenhänge als wirtschaftspolitisches Beispiel’, Jahrbücher des Kölnischen 
Geschichtsvereins, 21 (1939), 1-46.  
4
 For the details of the staple system and its changes throughout the late medieval period, see D. Nicholas, Town 
and Countryside: social, economic and political tensions in fourteenth-century Flanders (Bruges, 1971), 118-
120. J.A. Van Houtte, De geschiedenis van Brugge (Tielt, 1982), 195-196. 
5
 Even though Damme was originally founded and developed by the Flemish counts. A. De Smet, ‘L’origine des 
ports du Zwin. Damme, Mude, Monikerede, Hoeke et Sluis’, in: Études d’Histoire Dédiées à la Mémoire de 
Henri Pirenne par ses Anciens Élèves (Brussels, 1937), 125-141. W. Leloup and B. Vannieuwenhuyze, ‘Damme 
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in fief by the obstinate member of the comital family John of Namur and Bruges’ most 
important seaport after Damme had become inaccessible to high tonnage ships. A two-day 
sack was necessary in 1323 to make the town abide by the Bruges privileges granted earlier 
that year, which, apart from subjecting it to the staple obligations, denied its citizens the right 
to produce cloth, to engage in money changing and to use a large weight. Sluys was forbidden 
to erect fortifications and guildsmen were expected to follow the statutes of the Bruges 
guilds.
7
 These constraints did not prevent the outport from challenging Bruges’ commercial 
primacy. In 1358 Count Louis of Male had to reconfirm the staple privilege and order his 
officers to respect it.
8
 In 1367 he reprimanded the Sluyzenaars for conducting brokerage 
illegally but allowed them to buy wood for personal use.
9
 Some thirty years and numerous 
quarrels later Sluys obtained the right to store wood, pitch and tar in order to repair the ships 
in its harbour. Its promise not to resell these commodities was never kept.
10
  
 
In the fifteenth century Sluys was often supported in its claims by Ghent, Ypres and the 
Liberty of Bruges, the rural district surrounding the city, whom, together with Bruges, made 
up the representative institution of the Four Members of Flanders.
11
 Keen on reducing their 
counterpart’s economic power, they were able to convince Duke Philip the Good to withdraw 
the staple restrictions on a wide range of goods in 1419. Only after Bruges had taken the 
matter to the Parliament of Paris was the exemption limited to merchandise produced in 
Flanders, except cloth, and the condition was added that nothing could be sold to foreigners.
12
 
In 1436, discontent about the Sluyzenaars’ persistent violations of the staple privileges, 
                                                                                                                                                        
en Sluis : de oorsprong en vroege stadsontwikkeling van twee Middeleeuwse Zwinstadjes’, Handelingen van het 
Genootschap voor Geschiedenis, 150 (2013), 13-56. M. Ryckaert, ‘Brügge und die flandrischen Häfen vom 12. 
Bis 18. Jahrhundert’, in : See – und Flußhäfen vom Hochmittelalter bis zur Industrialisierung, ed. H. Stoob 
(Köln, 1986), 129-139.  M. Ryckaert, ‘La gestion des ports flamands au Moyen Age’, in : I porti come impresa 
economica, ed. S. Cavaciocchi (Firenze, 1988), 355-356, 358. A Verhulst, ‘Initiative comtale et développement 
économique en Flandre au XIIe siècle : le rôle de Thierry et de Philippe d’Alsace (1128-1191)’, in : Miscellanea 
Medieaevalia in Memoriam Jan Frederik Niermeyer (Groningen, 1967), 232, 237.  
6
 For the impact of the staple on their economies, see J.P. Sosson, ‘Les petites villes du Zwin (XIVe-XVIe 
siècles): des espaces urbaines “inviables”’ in: Commerce, finances et société (XIe-XVIe siècles). Receuil de 
travaux d’histoire médiévale offert à M. le professeur Henri Dubois, ed. P. Contamine (Paris, 1993), 171-184. 
For Monnikerede in particular, B. Fossion, ‘Un exemple de décadence urbaine : la petite ville de Monnikerede 
(1393-1482)’, Bulletin trimestriel du Crédit communal de Belgique, 171 (1990), 43-49. 
7
 Inventaire des archives de la ville de Bruges. Section 1: treizième au seizième siècle. Inventaire des chartes, ed. 
L. Gilliodts-Van Severen (Bruges, 1871-1885), VI, 531-532. 
8
 Cartulaire de Louis de Male, Comte de Flandre, ed. T. de Limburg-Stirum (Bruges, 1901), II, 156-158. 
9
 Coutumes des pays et comté de Flandre. Quartier de Bruges. Coutumes des petites villes et seigneuries 
enclavées. IV: Ostende, Oudenbourg, Sluis, ed. L. Gilliodts-Van Severen (Brussels, 1892), 460-462. 
10
 Inventaire, ed. Gilliodts-Van Severen, V, 234-236. 
11
 W.P. Blockmans, ‘A typology of representative institutions in late medieval Europe’, Journal of Medieval 
History, 4 (1978), 198-199. 
12
 Inventaire, ed. Gilliodts-Van Severen, IV, 357-362. 
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together with the ducal reluctance to stop them, served as the main casus belli touching off the 
Bruges Revolt against Philip the Good.
13
 After he had crushed the uprising in 1438 and had 
punished the rebellious Brugeois by, among other measures, temporarily transferring the 
staple to Sluys, the Duke aimed to settle the matter with a final judgment in Hesdin in 1441. 
He considerably extended the range of commodities that could be unloaded at the Zwin 
mouth, now including exotic fruits and animals and fresh fish. Bruges, on the other hand, was 
to install two officers in its outport to watch over the observance of its staple privileges. A 
permanent commission was established to settle conflicts concerning the staple.
14
 
 
In spite of these settlements, disputes continued. In 1477, Bruges and the other major Flemish 
cities took advantage of Mary of Burgundy’s precarious position during the troublesome 
succession of Charles the Bold by obtaining far-reaching concessions, including a 
confirmation of the staple privilege and the submission of the Zwin towns.
15
 In 1487, the city 
again requested and was granted the preservation of their staple rights by Archduke 
Maximilian of Austria and his son Philip the Fair.
16
 Constitutional fiction had been overtaken 
by economic reality though. The Flemish Revolt, which had ravaged the county between 1477 
and 1492 and which had also seriously damaged Sluys, struck the fatal blow upon Bruges’ 
position as a hub for international trade, already on the wane for decades. In 1488, the Bruges 
staple officer could only watch the merchant fleets sailing by the Zwin.
17
 During the 1490s, 
the foreign merchant communities which, for 200 years, had been the alpha and omega of the 
city’s commercial fortune, left for Antwerp, never to return.18 
 
That the extent of market rights in Bruges’ immediate hinterland gave rise to such heated 
debates throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries should hardly surprise. The 
organisation of commercial markets did far more than simply bringing buyers and sellers 
together, certainly if market rights were supported by staple regulations. It facilitated princely 
rulers, urban authorities and private individuals to impose taxes and tolls on the trade flows 
                                                 
13
 J. Dumolyn, De Brugse Opstand van 1436-1438 (Heule, 1997), 89-98. 
14
 Inventaire, ed. Gilliodts-Van Severen, V, 231-251. 
15
 W.P. Blockmans, ‘Breuk of continuïteit? De Vlaamse Privilegiën van 1477 in het licht van het 
staatsvormingsproces’, in: Le Privilège général et les privilèges régionaux de Marie de Bourgogne pour les 
Pays-Bas, ed. W.P. Blockmans (Kortrijk, 1985), 495–516. 
16
 Inventaire, ed. Gilliodts-Van Severen, VI, 273. 
17
 R. Degryse, ‘Brugge en de organisatie van het loodswezen van het Zwin op het einde van de XVe eeuw’. 
Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis, 112 (1975), 88-89. 
18
 J. Maréchal, ‘Le depart de Bruges des marchands etrangers (XVe-XVIe siècle)’, Handelingen van het 
Genootschap voor Geschiedenis, 88 (1951), 26-74. 
 5 
they generated and, in some cases, collect considerable revenue.
19
 When accessing the Zwin 
estuary, merchants were charged a droit de congé or oorlof, followed by the passaigegeld, 
spellegeld, wazegeld, leenknechtgeld, zettegeld and a tax on the loading of ballast, as well as 
the toll in the port of Damme. The revenues from these impositions disappeared into the 
coffers of the Dukes of Burgundy. Upon arrival traders were expected to pay the Bruges Toll, 
originally a princely contribution which had been alienated to and was collected by the noble 
Van Luxemburg family.
20
 
 
The concentration of trade in one and the same place also served the interests of those who 
made their living by providing commercial services. In Bruges, foreign merchants were 
expected to hire native brokers whenever they wanted to trade with non-locals and had to pay 
brokerage fees for the work they provided. The brokers worked closely together with the 
hostellers, who, as the owners of the taverns and inns where most temporary visitors gathered 
to stay, gain information and strike business deals, controlled the space where a great deal of 
Bruges’ international trade ignited.21 For both groups, who at the time of Bruges’ emergence 
as a world market at the end of the thirteenth century had left active trade abroad behind 
themselves, the staple system constituted their life insurance. Finally, only allowing 
commercial exchange to take place within the city made it easier for both urban authorities 
and corporate bodies to regulate it. In Bruges, most retail trade was restricted to the members 
of the craft guilds, who closely looked after their privileges.
22
 The commercial and financial 
elites of brokers and hostellers, together with the representatives of specific craft guilds, were 
the ones who, for most of the late medieval period, manned the aldermen’s benches in the 
Bruges city hall,
23
 and defined the city’s policy with regard to the staple privileges.24 
                                                 
19
 For the importance of toll revenues for urban finances in medieval England, see J. Masschaele, ‘Toll and trade 
in medieval England’, in: Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: Essays in Honour of John H.A. 
Munro, ed. L. Armstrong, I. Elbl and M.M. Elbl (Leyden, 2007), 341-354. 
20
 A. VAN NIEUWENHUYSEN, Les Finances du Duc de Bourgogne Philippe le Hardi (1384-1404). Economie et 
Politique, Brussles 1984, pp. 168-177, 182-3. 
21
 A. Greve, Hansische Kaufleute, Hosteliers und Herbergen im Brügge des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt 
am Main, 2012). 
22
 P. Stabel, ‘Guilds in late medieval Flanders: myths and realities of guild life in an export-oriented 
environment’, Journal of Medieval History, 30 (2004), 195. 
23
 For the period until 1384, see D. Van den Auweele, Schepenbank en schepenen in Brugge (1127-1384). 
Bijdrage tot de studie van een gewone stedelijke rechts- en bestuursinstelling (Leuven, 1977), 409. For the 
period between 1375 and 1407, see K. Vanhaverbeke, ‘De reële machtsstructuren binnen het stadsbestuur van 
Brugge in de periode 1375-1407. Verslag van een prosopografische studie’, Handelingen van het Genootschap 
voor Geschiedenis te Brugge, 135 (1998), 24. For the period between 1406 and 1436,  see Dumolyn, De Brugse 
Opstand, 112.  
24
 Violation of the staple privileges triggered the Bruges Revolt in 1436, which had the craft guilds at the 
forefront of political action, and continued to figure among the main complaints throughout the whole period of 
rebellion. J. Dumolyn, ‘‟Rebelheden ende vergaderinghen”. Twee Brugse documenten uit de grote opstand van 
 6 
It has often been argued that for the many foreign visitors flocking to Bruges, the additional 
costs created by the taxation and regulation of trade were remarkably low in comparison to 
other commercial centres. The little evidence relating to transaction costs in Bruges that has 
been preserved confirms these assumptions: transaction costs were only of marginal 
importance for the representatives of the Florentine Medici firm,
25
 the commission agents 
trading for the Pratese Datini company,
26
 the clients banking with the Milanese Borromei
27
 or 
the textile merchants calling on the services of broker Wouter Ameyde.
28
 For most of these 
traders, the costs also constituted an investment that paid dividends. At the Bruges market, 
merchants were given access to a concentration of commercial institutions that went 
unrivalled in Western Europe and could greatly reduce the overall costs of their business. 
Search and information costs could be kept low by frequenting the hostels that served as 
meeting points for everyone trading in the city.
29
 Italian banks and local money changers 
allowed traders to transfer money to anyone in Europe cheaply and safely.
30
 The foreign 
merchant guilds, the urban authorities and the central institutions organized a court system 
that enabled them to settle disputes efficiently against limited enforcement costs.
31
 There are 
                                                                                                                                                        
1436-1438’, Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis, 162 (1996), 301-302. Requests 
were made against the Great and the Flemish Privilege, which had been brokered by the city’s commercial elites, 
in 1477 but the confirmation of the staple was no issue. On the contrary: amendments were made to the Privilege 
under pressure of the Nine Members, comprising the deans of the craft guilds, and repeated the observance of the 
staple restrictions. J. Haemers, For the Common Good. State Power and Urban Revolts in the Reign of Mary of 
Burgundy (1477-1482) (Turnhout, 2009), 156-164. In 1488, the Great Council, a coalition of the commercial 
elites and the craft guilds, explicitly demanded the protection of the city’s staple rights. J. Dumolyn, ‘‘Our land 
is only founded on trade and industry.’ Economic discourses in fifteenth-century Bruges’, Journal of Medieval 
History, 36 (2010), 377. 
25
 The Medici paid between 2 and 6 percent transaction costs on the sale of almonds and cardamom in Bruges in 
1441. R. De Roover, The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 (Washington, 1999), 145-147. 
26
 F. Melis, Documenti per la Storia Economica dei Secoli XIII-XVI (Firenze, 1972), 242-244. Transport, 
transaction and taxation accounted for about 15 percent of the total costs of a shipment of almonds in 1396. 
27
 The ledgers of the Milanese Borromei Bank, active in Bruges and London between 1436 and 1438 are 
accessible online: http://www.queenmaryhistoricalresearch.org/roundhouse/default.aspx. Search strings 
‘expenses’, ‘charges’, ‘transport’, ‘toll’, ‘packaging’, ‘brokerage’, ‘commission’ and, most revealingly, ‘drinks’. 
In December 1438, for example, 4s. 8d. Flemish brokerage fees were charged on the sale of seven casks of sugar 
belonging to Piero Gaetani of Palermo in Bruges. 
28
 P. Stabel, ‘Marketing cloth : manufacturers, brokers and merchants (14th-16th centuries)’, in: International 
trade in the Low Countries (14
th
-16
th
 centuries). Merchants, organisation, infrastructure, ed. P. Stabel, B. 
Blondé and A. Greve (Louvain-Apeldoorn, 2000), 32-35. Transaction costs on a relatively cheap say amounted 
to 4.4 percent of the value paid to the draper. More on the impact of transaction costs on prices in the Flemish 
textile industries in J.H. Munro, ‘The origins of the English ‘New Draperies’: the Resurrection of an Old Flemish 
Industry, 1270-1570’, in: The New Draperies in the Low Countries and England, 1300-1800, ed. N.B. Harte 
(Oxford 1997), 74-83. 
29
 J.M. Murray, ‘Of nodes and networks: Bruges and the infrastructure of trade in fourteenth-century Europe’ in: 
International trade in the Low Countries (14
th
-16
th
 centuries). Merchants, organisation, infrastructure, ed. P. 
Stabel, B. Blondé and A. Greve (Louvain-Apeldoorn, 2000), 1-14. 
30
 J.M. Murray, Bruges, Cradle of Capitalism, 1280-1390 (Cambridge, 2005), . 
31
 J. Dumolyn and B. Lambert, ‘Cities of commerce, cities of constraints: International trade, government 
institutions and the law of commerce in later medieval Bruges and the Burgundian state’, Low Countries Journal 
of Social and Economic History, 11 (2014), 90-95. 
 7 
also indications, however, that, at times, merchants considered this return no longer sufficient 
for the transaction costs they were paying. The Florentine Alberti company avoided the 
Bruges market by purchasing cloth straight from the producers in the Lys town of Wervik, 
while the Hanseatic League did likewise in Poperinge.
32
 In the 1470s, the urban authorities 
themselves found it necessary to lower transaction costs by buying off all princely tolls on the 
Zwin, first, in 1470, for the Scots, then, in 1479, for all foreign visitors.
33
 
 
If transaction costs in Bruges could be too high for the cream of high trade and finance, such 
as the Alberti, they certainly could be for those less privileged. Apart from Italian merchant-
bankers and Hanseatic wholesalers, the Flemish shores were also frequented by one-off 
visitors, small scale producers and international shipping crews with an interest in trade. They 
did not stay in the city’s hostels, did not open accounts with its banks and hardly ever sued in 
its courts, but they were expected to travel to Bruges, to pay tolls and conform to costly 
regulations in the same way as others were. For most of them, Bruges’ transaction costs were 
no high-yield investment but an immediate write-off, that could make the difference between 
loss and break-even. James Masschaele has demonstrated how, in medieval England, 
agricultural producers were integrated into market exchange by allowing them to trade against 
low transaction costs at nearby intermediate markets.
34
 The Bruges staple system did exactly 
the opposite: it made it compulsory for small scale traders to participate in the most highly 
institutionalized market of Western Europe and to bear all of its costs. 
 
Formal markets, licensed and overseen by public authorities, were not the only commercial 
outlets, however. Throughout the whole medieval period, informal circuits, where trade was 
conducted without official authorisation, regulation and taxation, have proliferated across 
Europe.
35
 This article will investigate whether such an informal market existed in fifteenth-
                                                 
32
 F. Melis, ‘La diffusione nel Mediterraneo occidentale dei panni di Wervicq e delle altre Città della Lys attorno 
al 1400’, in : Studi in Onore di Amintore Fanfani. III Medioevo (Milan, 1962), 217-243. S. Abraham-Thisse, ‘Le 
commerce des draps de Flandre en Europe du Nord: Faut-il encore parler du déclin de la draperie flamande au 
bas moyen âge ?’, in : La draperie ancienne des Pays-Bas : débouchés et stratégies de survie (14e-16e siècles), 
ed. M. Boone and W. Prevenier (Leuven, 1993), 198-199. 
33
 SAB, Cartulary Groenenboek Ongecotteerd, f. 271. SAB, Political Charters, 1
st
 Series, 1165. For the annual 
payments to the duke, see SAB, City Accounts, 1491-1492, f. 155 r. 
34
 J. Masschaele, Peasants, Merchants, and Markets: Inland Trade in Medieval England, c. 1150-c. 1350 (New 
York, 1997), 53-54. 
35
 R.H. Britnell, The Commercialisation of English Society 1000-1500 (Cambridge, 1993), 9-10, 97-101, 161-
164. R. Britnell, ‘Markets, shops, inns and private houses in medieval English trade’, in: Buyers and Sellers. 
Retail circuits and practices in medieval and early modern Europe, ed. B. Blondé, P. Stabel, J. Stobart and I. 
Van Damme (Turnhout, 2006), 112-114. C. Dyer, ‘The Consumer and the Market in the Later Middle Ages’, 
Economic History Review, 42, 3 (1989), 323-324. E.T. Jones, Inside the Illicit Economy. Reconstructing the 
 8 
century Sluys and what its relationship was with the formal kind of commercial exchange in 
Bruges, channelled through the staple and taxed along the way. Over the past five decades, 
several schools of thought have considered this link between both forms of economic 
activities.
36
 The so-called Dualists believe that the informal sector is the less advantaged part 
of an economy which cannot create sufficient regulated opportunities for the entire 
population. Its existence is, thus, unrelated to the way in which the formal sector is 
organized.
37
 The Structuralist School sees people involved in informal circuits as 
subordinated economic units used by capitalist operators to reduce the costs of formal 
activities.
38
 Voluntarists claim that those who engage in the informal sector choose to do so, 
after comparing the costs and benefits of informality relative to formality.
39
 This article 
adopts the Legalist point of view, which states that the regulatory environment of the formal 
economy creates barriers and costs that drive people into informality.
40
 It will argue that, 
throughout the fifteenth century, an informal market developed in Sluys which was mainly 
frequented by those people who could not meet the costs created by the formal staple 
exchange in Bruges and who traded informally out of necessity. 
 
As it was in the interest of actors to keep their unregulated activities hidden and they do not 
appear in most economic sources, it was necessary to resort to the records of the sanctions for 
informality in order to do so. The accounts of the water bailiff, the legal officer exercising 
ducal authority and jurisdiction in the harbour of Sluys, contain the details of numerous 
people, both buyers and sellers, who evaded the staple rules or the payment of the congé or 
oorlof tax. Had they committed only small infringements or could they plead extenuating 
circumstances, they might have got away with a financial arrangement or ‘composition’.41 In 
                                                                                                                                                        
Smugglers’ Trade of Sixteenth Century Bristol (Farnham, 2012), 17-36. P. Stabel, ‘From the market to the shop. 
Retail and urban space in late medieval Bruges’, in: Buyers and Sellers, ed. Blondé, Stabel, Stobart and Van 
Damme, 101-103. 
36
 For an overview, see M.A. Chen, ‘The informal economy: definitions, theories and policies’, WIEGO Working 
Papers, 1 (2012), 4-6. 
37
 See, for example, S.V. Sethuraman, ‘The urban informal sector: concept, measurement and policy’, 
International Labour Review, 114, 1 (1976), 69-81. Beyond Regulation: The Informal Economy in Latin 
America, ed. V. Tokman (Boulder (CO), 1972). 
38
 See, for example, C.N. Moser, ‘Informal sector or petty commodity production: dualism or independence in 
urban development’, World Development, 6 (1978), 1041-1064. The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced 
and Less Advanced Developed Countries, ed. A. Portes, M. Castells and L.A. Benton (Baltimore (MD), 1989. 
39
 See, for example, W.F. Maloney, ‘Informality revisited’, World Development, 32, 7 (2004), 1159-1178. 
40
 See, for example, H. de Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism (New York, 1989), H. de 
Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York, 
2000). 
41
 On these financial arrangements, see G. Dupont, ‘Le temps des compositions. Pratiques judiciaires à Bruges et 
à Gand du XIV
e
 au XVI
e
 siècle (Partie I), in : «Préférant miséricorde à rigueur de justice». Pratiques de la 
grâce (XIIIe-XVIIe siècles). Actes de la journée d’études de Louvain-la-Neuve, 15 octobre 2007, ed. B. Dauven 
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more serious staple cases, the water bailiff or the Bruges representatives summoned offenders 
before the Bruges bench of aldermen, whose verdicts were registered in the Civiele 
Sententiën, the registers of civil justice, and the city’s cartularies. From 1450 onwards, the 
fines they imposed, two thirds of which fell to the Duke and one third to the city, have been 
recorded in the bailiff accounts as well.
42
 Pieced together, these sources have allowed us to 
reconstruct the commercial circuit in Bruges’ surroundings that was not mentioned in the 
Libelle of Englyshe Polycye. The first section of the article will deal with those who 
frequented this market from within the county of Flanders, as well as their motivations. A 
second part will consider the informal traders who came from further afield. A final section 
addresses the strategies used by both groups to avoid formal commercial exchange. 
 
Numbers and backgrounds of the infringers 
 
The accounts of the water bailiff of Sluys have been preserved from 1400 until 1411 and from 
1450 until 1479. They contain 245 cases in which people who had acted against the staple 
regulations or had not paid the droit de congé were allowed to make a ‘composition’. One 
hundred and twenty eight of these, or 11.6 per annum, occurred during the first eleven years 
of the fifteenth century. Bearing in mind that no information is available on the offenders 
brought before the Bruges aldermen in this period, the total number of infringements must 
have been significantly higher. 
 
Between 1450 and 1479, another 117 ‘compositions’ were agreed, giving an average of only 
four a year.
43
 Although Bruges may have lost some of its commercial allure from the 1460s 
                                                                                                                                                        
and X. Rousseaux (Louvain, 2012), 53-95. G. Dupont, ‘Le temps des compositions. Pratiques judiciaires à 
Bruges et à Gand du XIV
e
 au XVI
e
 siècle (Partie II), in : Amender, sanctionner et punir. Recherches sur 
l’histoire de la peine, du Moyen Âge au XXe siècle. Actes de la journée d’études de Louvain-la-Neuve, 19-20 
octobre 2009, ed. M.A. Bourguignon, B. Dauven and X. Rousseaux (Louvain, 2012), 15-47. J. Van Rompaey, 
‘Het compositierecht in Vlaanderen van de veertiende tot de achttiende eeuw’, Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis, 29 (1961), 43-79. M. Boone, ‘Want remitteren is princelijck. Vorstelijk genaderecht en 
sociale realiteiten in de Bourgondische periode’, in: Liber Amicorum Achiel De Vos, ed. L. Stockman and P. 
Vandermeersch (Evergem, 1989), 53-59. 
42
 The Bruges magistracy was the only court of first instance entitled to judge infringements against the Bruges 
staple privileges. In 1446, the duke ordered the central Council of Flanders to refer a staple case involving two 
Englishmen back to the aldermen. SAB, Cartulary Rodenboek, f. 173 v.-174 r. In 1427, Damme confirmed 
Bruges’ jurisdiction over staple cases in the town. SAB, Political Charters, 1st Series, 968. Apart from some 
fragments, the Civiele Sententiën have been preserved from 1447 to 1453, from 1453 to 1460, from 1465 to 1470 
and from 1490 to 1492. The most relevant cartularies with respect to the staple system are the Groenenboek 
(1408-1458) and the Nieuwe Groenenboek Ongecotteerd (1447-1533). 
43
 Contrary to the rise in the number of infringements witnessed by Jan Van Houtte, as a result of a tendency 
towards free trade among the merchants. Van Houtte, De geschiedenis van Brugge, 186. 
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onwards,
44
 this was not necessarily caused by a decline of economic activity in the Zwin 
Estuary. When we take into consideration the nature of the facts, the sharp drop in the number 
of congé evasions (from 8.3 to 2.4 a year) may also have been due to the many exemptions 
which were granted on this tax in the second half of the century,
45
 as well as to a less 
consistent policy by the ducal officers.
46
 The more gradual decline in the number of staple 
‘compositions’ (from 2.8 to 1.7 a year) may imply a smaller number of crimes committed 
because restrictions were softened following the Hesdin ordinance, or, again, a change in the 
water bailiff’s behaviour, by arresting fewer malefactors or, on the contrary, referring more of 
them to the Bruges bench of aldermen. The bailiff accounts, the Civiele Sententiën and the 
city’s cartularies give 53 cases judged by the aldermen between 1450 and 1479, meaning that 
from the average 3.5 crimes committed against the staple a year, 1.7 were considered serious 
enough to go to court. This brings the total number of staple and congé infringements in this 
period up to 170. 
 
Flemish offenders 
 
From 1400 until 1411, at least 25.9 percent of the infringers came from within the county of 
Flanders. It is likely this was only a minimum, as the 16.5 percent whose origins remain 
unknown must have contained an unspecified number of Flemings as well. Between 1450 and 
1479 the origins of the smugglers were recorded much less consistently, leading to a dark 
figure of more than 40 percent. In this respect it seems safe to assume that the true Flemish 
share during this period must have been considerably higher than the unfortunate 10.5 percent 
mentioned as Flemings in the accounts.  
 
                                                 
44
 1464 marked the outset of a period of deterioration in the city’s Grand Tonlieu receipts. R. Van Uytven, ‘La 
Flandre et le Brabant, ‘terres de promission’ sous les ducs de Bourgogne?’ Revue du Nord, 43 (1961), 282. 
45
 Van Houtte, De geschiedenis van Brugge, 196. 
46
 In 1395, the farmers of the droit de congé were complaining that the water bailiff was too harsh, deterring 
merchants and making their revenues fall. Ordonnances de Philippe le Hardi, de Marguerite de Male et de Jean 
Sans Peur 1381-1419. Tome II contenant les Ordonnances de Philippe le Hardi et de Marguerite de Male du 17 
janvier 1394 au 25 février 1405, ed. J. Bartier, P. Bonenfant and A. Van Nieuwenhuysen (Brussels,1974), 94-98. 
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At the beginning of the fifteenth century, 48.5 percent of the Flemish offenders lived in Sluys 
or, occasionally, in another town in the Zwin Estuary. The high number of locals is of little 
surprise. Although Sluys was better equipped to resist the economic stranglehold imposed by 
Bruges than the smaller Zwin ports,
47
 the staple arrangements restricted its citizens even in the 
relief of their most elementary economic needs. Most of the Sluyzenaars were caught for 
buying foodstuffs, such as bacon or fish, or shipping equipment for personal use from 
foreigners. A minority of the sanctioned, such as Pieter Pijk,
48
 was involved in the 
international carrying-trade itself and tried to make a profit by illegally selling part of their 
freight, often wine, in a more organized way. In the period after 1450, the local share of 
Flemish infringers rises to 55.6 percent. Apparently the Hesdin ordinance had not taken away 
the need for the Zwin towns’ inhabitants to break the staple rules in order to have a normal 
economic life.  
 
The second largest group of smuggling Flemings were the Brugeois. Bruges citizens with 
business interests in Sluys,
49
 for whom the costs involved in the regular staple trade were an 
insurmountable obstacle or who had no direct interest in concentrating commercial activities 
in Bruges in general committed some 20 percent of the Flemish staple offences (18.2 percent 
                                                 
47
 Sosson, ‘Les petites villes du Zwin’, 171-184. A. Saunier, ‘L'Ecluse. Une autre ville jetée à la mer?’, in : Villes 
et sociétés urbaines au Moyen Age: Hommage à M. le Professeur Jacques Heers, ed. G. Jehel (Paris, 1994), 97-
103. 
48
 ADN, Série B, 6095, Account Water Bailiff 1403-1404, f. 1 v. 
49
 Freight-carriers as well as fishmongers. Mostly they are referred to as ‘Brugeois demourant a Lescluse’. See, 
for example, ADN, B 6091, Account Water Bailiff 1402-1402, f. 2 r. and ADN, B 6106, Account Water Bailiff 
1407-1407, f. 2 r. 
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in the first period, 22.2 percent in the second). Only one of them, the goldsmith Andries 
Dankaert, was is recorded as being a member of one of the craft guilds.
50
 Once again, the 
staple system was welcomed by some, but obviously not all groups within the city. Between 
1400 and 1411, their number hardly exceeded that of the Ghentenaars though, who, in the 
fifteenth century, used to sail down the Lieve to buy foodstuffs on the staple market in 
Damme.
51
 The bailiff accounts show that some of them, 15.2 percent of the Flemish 
offenders, tried to buy cured herring or fruit more cheaply in Sluys. This practice became less 
frequent between 1450 and 1479, with only 5.6 percent of the arrested Flemings coming from 
Ghent in this period. 
 
 
Most of the cured herring bought by the Ghentenaars and others in Sluys must have been 
supplied by the small fishing ports of Ostend, Nieuwpoort, Lombardsijde and Heist, who were 
responsible for the remaining 5 to 12 percent of the Flemish smugglers. Throughout the 
fourteenth century, this fish had been imported into Flanders from Scania by the Hanseatic 
merchants. Benefiting from the interruption of the almost industrially organised Hanseatic 
fishing activities at the beginning of the fifteenth century, Flemish coastal towns had started to 
cure herring themselves on their ships. This, together with the use of new vessels, had enabled 
                                                 
50
 ADN, B 6133, Account Water Bailiff 1458-1459, f. 2 v. Dankaert had moved from Lille to Bruges to work as 
a goldsmith in 1445. Indices op de Brugsche Poorterboeken. I 1418-1450, ed. R.A. Parmentier (Bruges, 1938), 
288-289. 
51
 J. Decavele and R. De Herdt, Gent op de wateren en naar de zee (Antwerpen, 1976),  46. M Coornaert, ‘De 
geschiedenis van de Brugse Leie’, in: De Witte Kaproenen. De Gentse Opstand & de Geschiedenis van de 
Brugse Leie, ed. M. Vandermaesen, M. Ryckaert and M. Coornaert (Ghent, 1979), 33-55. 
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them to take over a large part of the domestic market, despite the resistance of urban and 
princely authorities, who wanted to maintain good relations with the Hanseatic League.
52
 
 
In theory, cured herring could only be sold in the fishing towns themselves or on the staple 
market of Damme. In reality, many Flemish fishermen, as well as the Hollanders and the 
Zeelanders, who had also begun to cure herring at sea, avoided the extra transport costs, the 
imposition of taxes, the expensive services of brokers and the covetous eyes of civil servants
53
 
by bringing part of their fish to the black market in Sluys, buying highly-finished goods or 
shipping equipment in exchange. In the course of the fifteenth century, a concentration of 
fishing activities in the larger centres, such as Nieuwpoort or Ostend, occurred at the expense 
of the smaller ports.
54
 This might explain why, between 1450 and 1479, only Lombardsijde is 
still mentioned in the bailiff accounts and the total share of the herring ports in the number of 
Flemish staple infringements nosedives from 12.1 to 5.6 percent. Nieuwpoort and Ostend 
completely took over the regular markets, the black market being the only resource left for the 
small towns that had managed to survive. 
 
While their social position was recorded less consistently in the second period, the offenders 
were qualified as ‘poor’ in 53.1 percent of the Flemish cases and 68.4 percent of the cases 
where the origins were unknown during the first period, many of them burdened, so the 
accounts say, by the costs of supporting a family and heavy rents.
55
 These were the people for 
whom the additional costs inherent to the staple system were not of marginal importance, as 
they were for the wealthy merchants and bankers in Bruges, but actually made a difference. 
Travelling down the Zwin, paying for transport and taxes and complying to all regulatory 
requirements would have dramatically increased the price of the small amounts of goods they 
                                                 
52
 R. Degryse, ‘De Vlaamse haringvisserij in de XVe eeuw’, Handelingen van het Genootschap voor 
Geschiedenis te Brugge (Emulation), 88 (1951), 116-131. C. Jahnke ‘The medieval herring fishery in the 
Western Baltic’, in: Beyond the Catch: Fisheries of the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic, 900-1850, 
ed. L. Sicking and D. Abreu-Ferreira (Leyden, 2009), 177-178. See also the attempt by the Burgundian dukes to 
install a toll on the sale of herring in 1465, which met with fierce resistance from the small Flemish coastal 
towns. M. Boone, ‘Les ducs, les villes et l’argent des contribuables. Le rêve d’un impôt princier permanent en 
Flandre à l’époque bourguignonne’, in : L’impôt au Moyen Âge. L’impôt public et le prélèvement seigneurial fin 
XIIe-début XVIe siècle. II. Les espaces fiscaux. Colloque tenu à Bercy les 14, 15 et 16 juin 2000, ed. P. 
Contamine, J. Kervervé and A. Rigaudière (Paris, 2002), 333. 
53
 In 1399 a ducal ordinance was issued to ban the widespread habit among government officers, water bailiffs in 
particular, of extorting herring from Flemish fishermen. Ordonnances de Philippe le Hardi. Tome II, ed. Bartier, 
331-333. 
54
 P. Stabel, Dwarfs among Giants. The Flemish Urban Network in the Late Middle Ages (Leuven-Apeldoorn, 
1997), 49-50. 
55
 In 1401-1402, Pierre de Breda of Ghent was given a ‘composition’, because he was ‘a very poor man 
burdened with a rent and the care of small children’. AND, B 6089, Account Water Bailiff 1401-1402, f. 3 v. 
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were interested in buying or selling. For them, trading outside the staple, branded as a crime 
undermining urban privileges by the authorities defining the range of staple commodities in 
the Bruges city hall, was a matter of survival.
56
 The prevalence of these people, excluded 
from formal exchange by the implications of market regulation, among the Flemish offenders 
strongly supports the Legalist explanation of informal activities in Sluys. 
 
Of course, the question arises as to which extent the qualifications given in the sources were a 
true reflection of the smugglers’ social conditions. First of all, we must bear in mind that the 
term ‘poor’ did not necessarily cover the same social and economic categories during the 
fifteenth century as it does today. An analysis of ‘poor’ delinquents in the Bruges sheriff 
accounts between 1385 and 1550 identifies them as low wage workers, often without 
permanent employment.
57
 Even so, offenders of the staple rules could have claimed a ‘povre 
estat’ which they were not entitled to in order to avoid a costly lawsuit or been allowed one by 
the water bailiff, for whom ‘compositions’ left more room to make a profit.58 Jacob 
Plouchman, portrayed in the water bailiff accounts as a ‘simple man responsible for his wife 
and six little children’, in reality owned three houses with annexes in the heart of Bruges.59 
Lending credence to the Voluntarist interpretation of informal trade, bypassing the staple is 
likely to have been a matter of choice for him, made after an assessment of the costs and 
benefits of formal activities. Most of those qualified as ‘poor’ do not appear in other sources 
of the period, however, suggesting their social status was rather low. Being labelled ‘poor’ did 
not provide a free ticket to a ‘composition’ either and some ‘poor’ offenders were referred to 
the bench of aldermen as well.
60
 At the same time, the water bailiff’s activities were closely 
scrutinised by the Bruges representatives, in whose interests it was that their city’s privileges 
                                                 
56
 The difficulties of the economically less fortunate to participate in the regular commercial circuit were also 
experienced by the Castillian traveller Pero Tafur who, when visiting Bruges in the 1430s, wrote that ‘without 
doubt the goddess of luxury has great power there, but it is not a place for poor men who will be badly received’. 
Pero Tafur, travels and adventures 1435-1439, ed. M. Letts (London, 1926), 200. 
57
 Dupont, Le temps des compositions (Partie I), 90-93. 
58
 It gave him the opportunity to record a lower sum in his accounts than the one actually collected, embezzling 
the difference. Van Rompaey, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt, 70. For the abuse of the ‘composition’ procedure by 
ducal officers in 15
th
-century Holland, see W. Blockmans, ‘Privaat en openbaar domein. Hollandse ambtenaren 
voor de rechter onder de Bourgondiërs’, in: Peasants & Townsmen in medieval Europe. Studia in honorem 
Adriaan Verhulst, ed. J.M. Duvosquel and E. Thoen (Ghent, 1995), 713-715. On the difficulties of determining 
socio-economic categories in the historiography of the late medieval Southern Low Countries, see W. P. 
Blockmans and W. Prevenier, ‘Poverty in Flanders and Brabant from the Fourteenth to the Mid-Sixteenth 
Century: Sources and Problems’, Acta Historiae Neerlandicae, 10 (1978), 20-39. W. Blockmans, 
‘Circumscribing the Concept of Poverty’, in: Aspects of Poverty in Early Modern Europe, ed. T. Riis (Stuttgart, 
1981), 39-45. 
59
 ADN, B 6091, Account Water Bailiff 1402-1402, f. 1 r. He did have six children. SAB, Registers Orphans 
Chamber, St Nicolas, Book 2, f. 38 v. 
60
 See, for example, SAB, Cartulary Groenenboek A, f. 35 v. 
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be faithfully respected. Often, ‘compositions’ were granted with their approval61 and, 
sometimes, financial arrangements were asked for by the Bruges magistrate himself.
62
 
 
How gendered were the fifteenth-century staple and congé evasions? Between 1400 and 1479, 
28.3 percent of the Flemish offenders and 8.2 percent of the total number of  black marketeers 
were women, which is significantly higher than the female proportion of economic, fiscal and 
monetary crimes and crimes against property observed by the Bruges sheriff during the same 
period
63
 and on a par with the notable female involvement in informal economies elsewhere.
64
 
75 percent of the total number of women were penalised between 1400 and 1411, 25 percent 
of them after 1450. 52.4 percent of the female infringers were recorded only by their own 
names, suggesting that either they were part of the demographically substantial but 
consistently overlooked social minority of single women or that at least they were involved in 
commercial exchange on an independent basis.
65
 The category of the femme sole and its 
association with a lack of financial and personal support might also have been used in the 
hope that it would evoke sympathy though.
66
 Only one evader is specified as belonging to the 
economically powerful but socially vulnerable category of widows.
67
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 Cartulaire de l’ancien estaple de Bruges: recueil de documents concernant le commerce intérieur et maritime, 
les relations internationales et l’histoire économique de cette ville, ed. L. Gilliodts-Van Severen (Bruges, 1904-
1906), I, 444. 
62
 In 1404, Jehan de le Berghe of Dordrecht was given a composition ‘at the request of the law of Bruges, who 
spoke in his favour and begged the bailiff’. ADN, B 6098, Account Water Bailiff 1404-1404, f. 2 r. 
63
 Within the economic, fiscal and monetary crimes, women were responsible for six percent of the violations of 
urban and guild regulations on trade and industry and five percent of the offenses concerning the counterfeiting 
of certification marks, weights and measures and commercial and quality fraud. Of those committing crimes 
against property, 5,.5 percent were women. Some specific criminal acts, such as the possession of and the trade 
in stolen goods, with 15 percent of the culprits females, were more gendered, even though the sample here is that 
small that the statistical margin of error is high. I would like to thank Guy Dupont for providing me access to his 
PhD research on criminality in late medieval Bruges. Note that a very particular informal market in Bruges, that 
in sex, had a very outspoken female involvement. 84.4 percent of those fined for operating brothels in the city 
and 26.6 percent of those who owned ‘evil inns’ between 1385 and 1515 were women. G. Dupont, 
Maagdenverleidsters, hoeren en speculanten: prostitutie in Brugge tijdens de Bourgondische periode (1385-
1515) (Bruges, 1996), 108, 116. 
64
 In medieval England, for example, women were particularly active in the forestalling business, trading with 
dealers outside the market restrictions. R. Hilton, ‘Women Traders in Medieval England’, in: R. Hilton, Class 
Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism. Essays in Medieval Social History (London, 1990), 137. 
65
 Unlike in Mediterranean regions, single women could make up up to 40 percent of the female adult population 
in Northwestern Europe. M. Kowaleski, ‘Singlewomen in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. The 
Demographic Perspective’, in: Singlewomen in the European past, 1250-1800 , ed. J.M. Bennett and A.M. 
Froide (Philadelphia, 1999), 38-81. Specifically for Flanders, evidence exists of delayed age at marriage in 
fifteenth-century rural communities. E. Thoen, ‘Historical Demography in Late Medieval Rural Flanders: Recent 
Results and Hypotheses’, in: Peasants and Townsmen in Medieval Europe: Studia in Honorem Adriaan 
Verhulst, ed. J.M Duvosquel and E. Thoen (Ghent, 1995), 580-581. 
66
 For the all but neutral classification of single women in medieval sources and its use, see C. Beattie, The 
Politics of Social Classification in Late Medieval England (Oxford, 2007), 29-31. 
67
 For their legal and economic position, see B.A. Hanawalt, ‘The Widow’s Mite: Provisions for Medieval 
London Widows’, in: Upon My Husband’s Death: Widows in the Literature and Histories of Medieval Europe, 
 16 
 
Within the Flemish subgroup, a majority of 46.7 percent was referred to as the wives of their 
husbands, implying, as in most sectors of Bruges’ economy,68 that Flemish female 
involvement in the black market largely took place within the context of the household. These 
married women may have been active in Sluys to ensure their family of a complementary 
income or to provide their husband’s business with cheap supplies or an easily accessible 
market.
69
 As we do not have any information that links their male partners to formal 
economic activities, it is hard to develop this point further in a way that supports the 
Structuralist view on informality. Some individual cases,
70
 and the fact that only one of the 
women caught was summoned before the Bruges aldermen between 1412 and 1470 indicate 
that women may also have been used to carry out their partners’ plans or bore the burden for 
their husbands’ actions because they were more successful in obtaining advantageous 
arrangements from the authorities in case of arrest.
71
 Even more revealing is that all but one of 
the female Flemings were Sluyzenaars. Their disproportionately high involvement in a low-
end job whose most distinguishing characteristic was the absence of rules and guild control 
emphasizes the particularly straitened economic circumstances endured by the Zwin port’s 
women due to the staple restrictions, something also attested in literary sources.
72
 
 
Foreign offenders 
 
In the first period 57.5 percent of the infringers, and at least 49.4 percent in the second period 
did not have Flemish origins. To a certain extent, the share of each of the foreign groups in 
the number of offences reflects the changing fortunes they experienced on the medieval world 
market that Bruges was. In some respects, however, the bailiff accounts, the Civiele 
Sententiën and the cartularies paint a different picture of Bruges’ commercial landscape than 
the one commonly presented by most other sources. On the one hand, they reveal that some, 
                                                                                                                                                        
ed. L. Mirrer (Ann Arbor, 1992), 21-45.  For the Flemish context, see M. Danneel, Weduwen en wezen in het 
laat-middeleeuwse Gent (Leuven, 1996), 249-406. 
68
 Murray, Bruges, Cradle of Capitalism, 300-326.  
69
 P. Stabel, ‘A European Household Economy’, in: The Household in Late Medieval Cities, Italy and 
Northwestern Europe Compared ed. M. Carlier and T. Soens (Leuven, 2001), 121-125. 
70
 See, for example, the case involving Jehan de Cleyhem, which is elaborated further in the text. ADN, B 6099, 
Account Water Bailifff 1405-1405, f. 1 r. 
71
 A similar leniency of the judicial system towards women is seen in the fourteenth-century English countryside. 
B. A. Hanawalt, Crime and conflict in English communities 1300-1348 (Cambridge, MA, 1979), 116-117. 
72
 The miserable living conditions of some of these women particularly struck Pero Tafur who, while staying in 
Sluys, met a pauperess trying to save her daughters from starvation by offering them for sale. Pero Tafur, ed. 
Letts, 200-201. 
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most notably the Lucchese and, to a lesser extent, the Florentines, could perfectly orchestrate 
international trade and banking without participating in informal exchange at the Zwin 
entrance. On the other hand, they abound with staple and congé offences committed in Sluys 
by those servicing the international merchant communities but barred from, and thus invisible 
in, the centre of commercial exchange itself. Mariners and shipping crews supplying the 
goods from all parts of Europe and the lower-level staff of the established merchant colonies 
added the cosmopolitan flavour to that distinctive mix of local fishermen, craftspeople and 
economic outcasts which had more in common with the social composition of other European 
port towns than that within the Bruges’ own walls.73 The bailiff accounts, the Civiele 
Sententiën and the cartularies thus show us a segment of the city’s economic activity that is 
absent in nearly all other accounts. 
 
In the period 1400-1411, the Hollanders committed 16.5 percent and the Zeelanders 7 percent 
of the staple offences. These high numbers may be explained by the crucial role both groups 
played in the international wine trade. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, carrier-traders 
from Holland and Zeeland largely controlled the transport of wine from Poitou and Gascony 
to Flanders.
74
 The bailiff accounts suggest that a substantial part of their cargoes never 
reached the wine staple in Damme but was sold in Sluys. On their way to Southwestern 
France or to Flanders, the Hollanders and Zeelanders also offered the products of their own, 
rapidly expanding, economy in Sluys, such as butter, cured herring, cloth, which was cheaper 
than the Flemish fabrics, madder and, most of all, kuytbeer.
75
 
 
While no other foreign female involvement in the black market is recorded, 19 percent of 
these Holland traders were women, recorded by their own name. This remarkable female 
presence may be attributed to the poor economic prospects for single women in Holland’s 
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 M. Kowaleski, ‘Port towns : England and Wales 1330-1540’, in: The Urban History of Britain, vol. 1, ed. D. 
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fachada Cantábrica entre los siglos XII-XV’, Anales de la Universidad de Alicante, Historia Medieval, 16 (2009-
2010), 47-51. 
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siècle) (Paris, 1958), 128-129. 
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Uytven (Leuven, 1993), 54-57. On the nature of Holland’s economic growth during the late medieval period, see 
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Crisis, C.1350-C.1500’, Economic History Review, 57 (2004), 503-532. 
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cities such as Leyden,
76
 together with the comparatively greater freedom to trade enjoyed by 
women in cosmopolitan Bruges.
77
 From the 1420s onwards, the Hollanders and Zeelanders 
increasingly started carrying salt directly from the French bay of Bourgneuf to the Baltic 
without calling at Flanders.
78
 Accordingly, their share in the staple evasions in Sluys 
diminishes dramatically, with only 2.9 percent of the infringers originating from Zeeland and 
2.3 percent from Holland in the second half of the fifteenth century. 
 
 
The gap in the wine trade left by the Hollanders and the Zeelanders was filled by the Bretons. 
Benefiting from their duchy’s neutrality in the struggle between the French and the 
Burgundians,
79
 hundreds of merchants from Penmarc’h, Conquet, Saint-Pol de Léon or Saint-
Malo used their fishing vessels to ship wine from Southwestern France to the staple market in 
Damme or, later, to Walcheren.
80
 From the 40 shiploads of wine that were carried from 
Bordeaux to Flanders from 1470 until 1500, no less than 33 were transported by Breton 
                                                 
76
 Single women in late medieval Leyden predominantly performed the city’s worst jobs. M. Howell, Women, 
production and patriarchy in late medieval cities (Chicago, 1986), 86. 
77
 Murray, Bruges, Cradle of Capitalism, 326. Note that, between 1390 and 1439, the percentages of immigrants 
from the present-day Netherlands to Bruges, which included a considerable share of women, were higher than in 
any other period. E. Thoen, ‘Immigration to Bruges during the late Middle Ages’, in: Le Migrazioni in Europa. 
Secc. XIII-XVIII, ed. S. Cavaciocchi (Firenze, 1994), 345. 
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 Craeybeckx, Un grand commerce d’importation, 128-129. 
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 H. Touchard, Le commerce maritime breton à la fin du Moyen Age (Paris, 1967), 117-125. 
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 Craeybeckx, Un grand commerce d’importation, 135-138. J. Bernard, Navires et gens de mer à Bordeaux, 
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ships.
81
 Nearly absent in Bruges, the massive presence of Bretons in the Zwin Estuary, which 
is also attested by other sources,
82
 led to a spectacular rise in their numbers in the accounts of 
the water bailiff: while only 2.4 percent of the staple infringers came from Brittany between 
1400 and 1411, they even outnumber the Flemings with 11.6 percent between 1450 and 
1479.
83
  
 
Apart from a little canvas, bacon and Galician iron, the ‘Pety Bretayns’, as they were called 
by the author of the Libelle,
84
 sold dozens of barrels of wine in Sluys. Notarial acts drawn up 
before their departure from Bordeaux bear witness to the risks they incurred by doing so. In 
November 1475, several Bordelais merchants entrusted Gabriel Prat from Conquet with the 
shipment of 108 barrels of wine to Flanders. Within 21 days of his return, the Breton would 
be paid the equivalent of £86 lb. 5s. par. for his work.
85
 Some months later, he was fined £13 
4s. par., or almost one sixth of his remuneration, for having sold wine in breach of the 
staple.
86
 If Prat would have chosen freely to be involved in informal trade, as the Voluntarist 
view dictates, it is a choice he would not be likely to make again. It is more probable, 
however, that the strong presence of shipmen from Brittany, Holland and Zeeland and a 
minority of other French seamen, almost exclusively from the Atlantic coast, and responsible 
for 5.2 percent of the offenders in the second period,
87
 should be considered from a Legalist 
perspective. People from these regions are hardly ever represented in the sources documenting 
formal trade in Bruges. Only very occasionally did they make use of its institutions, they did 
not have a permanent community in the city and their contacts with more established 
                                                 
81
 Documents pour servir à l’histoire du commerce des Pays-Bas avec la France jusqu’à 1585. Tome II : Actes 
notariés de Bordeaux 1470-1520, ed. M.A. Drost (‘s Gravenhage, 1989), 594 p. 
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 In the spring of 1464, 41 of the 60 ships at anchor in the harbour of Sluys were Breton. R. Degryse, ‘De 
schepen in de haven van Sluis in het voorjaar 1464’, Mededelingen van de Marine Academie, 20 (1968), 97-98. 
In 1486-1487, 24 of the 75 ships entering the Zwin were Breton. Inventaire, ed. Gilliodts Van Severen, VI, 275-
276. 
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 It must be repeated, however, that the Flemish percentage of 10.4 percent was only a minimum. 
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 The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye, ed. Warner, 8. 
85
 Actes notariés de Bordeaux, ed. Drost, 6-7. 
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 ADN, B 6151, Account Water Bailiff 1474-1475, f. 1 v. 
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 Some of them were trading saffron. In Southwestern France, Montpellier acted as a redistribution centre for 
Catalan saffron to Northwestern Europe. K. L. Reyerson, ‘Commercial fraud in the middle ages: the case of the 
dissembling pepperer’, Journal of Medieval History, 8 (1982), 68. On the seamen from Atlantic France, M. 
Bochaca, ‘Les «gens de mer» dans le villes portuaires de la France atlantique à la fin du Moyen Âge: l’exemple 
de Bayonne, Bordeaux et Libourne’, in: Gentes de mar en la ciudad atlantica medieval, ed. J.A. 
SolórzanoTelechea, M. Bochaca and A. Aguiar Andrade (Logroño, 2012),  45-62. M. Bochaca and B.A. 
Bolumburu, ‘Marins, maîtres et propriétaires de navires à Bayonne à travers les ordonnances municipales du 
début du XIVe siècle’, in: Navires et gens de mer au Moyen Âge à nos jours (Paris, 2010), 45-54. 
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merchants were few and superficial.
88
 Lacking both economic and social capital, the most 
accessible way for them to share in the burgeoning market that they were servicing was an 
informal one. 
 
Unlike the Hollanders, the Zeelanders or the Bretons, most Italian, Castilian or Portuguese 
merchants living in Bruges were strictly organized in foreign merchant guilds, had an 
extensive commercial infrastructure at their disposal and comfortably rubbed shoulders with 
the city’s commercial and political elites. Although the Southern Europeans proved 
themselves active smugglers, these communities’ involvement in the black trade remained 
limited. This is not to say that the upper crust of trade and high finance never swindled the 
authorities: the experienced Portuguese sugar merchant Luís Martins,
89
 the Florentine 
Tommaso Portinari, manager of the Bruges Medici branch and counsellor of two Burgundian 
dukes,
90
 and the Venetian Luis Bembo, moneylender to the court,
91
 were all caught for 
seeking to bypass the staple rules and make the argument of sources biased by the protection 
of influential evaders a rather problematic one. Having full access to and even controlling 
formal trade in the city, their informal activities can only have been a matter of choice. In an 
environment where the demarcation between merchants and shipmen was less compelling 
than in Bruges, the overwhelming majority of staple crimes, however, was committed by the 
crews of the fleets connecting these resident foreigners with their homeland or by the 
merchants’ factors, clerks, errand boys and other employees. Their involvement could make a 
strong case for the Structuralist interpretation of informality, in which they would have 
supported the formal business of their senior compatriots. Yet it seems clear that the work of 
the established merchants suffered rather than benefited from the offences taking place in the 
outport. The communities’ official representatives often intervened after mischief had been 
done, trying to solve the problems
92
 and, above all, to minimize the consequences for their 
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 ADN, B 6125, Account Water Bailiff 1453-1453, f. 2 r. ADN, Recette Générale de Toutes les Finances, B 
1969, f. 231 v.-235 r. On the Bembo family, see F.C. Lane, Andrea Barbarigo, merchant of Venice 1418-1449 
(New York, 1967), 123-135.  
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 In 1449, the Venetian consul convinced the Bruges aldermen to remit the fine incurred by a crew member of a 
Venetian galley for having sold four dozen bellows against the staple. SAB, Civiele Sententiën, Register 1447-
1453, f. 73 r. See also SAB, Cartulary Groenenboek Ongecotteerd, f. 48 r. 
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guild members,
93
 many of whom demonstrated a true intention of respecting their host city’s 
rules.
94
 
 
The Genoese, who made up 5.5 percent of the offenders against the staple between 1400 and 
1411, must have been popular visitors in Sluys until the late 1450s. Genoese patrons and their 
seamen, sometimes whole carrack crews at once,
95
 halted in the Zwin town to buy cloth and 
to sell raisins, figs and malmsey wine. From the middle of the 1430s onwards, privateering 
wars fought with the Aragonese, the hostilities between the English and the French and the 
Burgundian aspirations in the Mediterranean seriously disturbed commercial relations 
between Genoa and Flanders.
96
 This probably explains why, after 1460, Genoese disappear 
completely from the statistics.
97
  
                                                 
93
 In a trial before the aldermen in 1446 concerning repeated infractions against the staple by the crews of 
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Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 121, 2 (2007), 77-142. 
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97
 After 1460, the Genoese also disappear from the chapters in the bailiff accounts concerning other crimes. J.A. 
Goris, ‘Etude historique sur les relations commerciales entre la Flandre et Gênes au moyen âge’, Annales du 
Comité Flamand de France, 28 (1906-1907), 144-145. See also J. Paviot, ‘Aspects de la navigation et de la vie 
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genovesi, 12 (1994), 247-261. 
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Eager to outstrip the Genoese also in this part of commercial exchange were the Venetians. 
While almost invisible during the first eleven years of the fifteenth century, accounting for 
only 0.8 percent of the infractions, Venetian galley crew flooded the black market with silk, 
sugar and rumney wine in the second period and forced up the Serenissima’s percentage in the 
amount of illicit traders to just under seven percent. Although much more pronounced, the 
changes in the numbers of Genoese and Venetians recorded at the Zwin mouth correspond 
more or less with the data provided by other sources. While Genoese merchants still topped 
the list of the foreign nations providing money to the city of Bruges in the first decades of the 
century, the most important contributions to forced loans and urban manifestations after 1435 
were consistently made by the Venetian community.
98
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 For the forced loan in 1411-1412, see Inventaire, ed. Gilliodts-Van Severen, IV, 90-91. For the forced loan in 
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Rather than a Structuralist view, a Legalist explanation can account for the widespread 
informal business of both Genoese and Venetian shipping staff. For all of the offenders, the 
costs of the formal staple trade must have had an impact. Genoese patrons were privately 
responsible for the construction and operation of their ships, the recruitment of their crews 
and, in the end, the profitability of their voyages.
99
 Venetian patrons were usually junior 
members of the nobility working for the state, but those caught in Sluys were more humble 
crew members such as scribes, pursers, barbers, trumpeters, oarsmen and other galley crew, 
often only identified in the bailiff accounts by their Christian name or their employment.
100
 It 
is significant that the only Venetian patron who was fined outside the state sponsored Muda 
convoys at a time when private ship owning was experiencing increasing difficulties,
101
 Ser 
Nadal Salomon, a regular in the trade with Flanders, had to hold on to a freight of malmsey 
wine in order to have his shipping costs reimbursed, saw no other option than to sell his 
carrack and was accused by fellow Venetians of having delivered damaged cotton, all within 
the space of six months. It is possible that these were the setbacks that pushed him into the 
informal market and into disposing of some of the cargo illicitly in 1467.
102
 
 
The Genoese and the Venetians, apart from a few Florentines in the second period (1.74 
percent)
103
 the only Italians in Sluys, were joined by dozens of other traders from all parts of 
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Papers of Frederic C. Lane (Baltimore, 1966), 8. 
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 Salomon was already involved in the wine trade in 1459. Melis, Documenti per la Storia Economica, 356, 
358. For the court hearings, see SAB, Civiele Sententiën, Register 1465-1469, f. 68 v.-69 r., 87 r.-v. For the 
staple case, see ADN, B 6144, Account Water Bailiff 1467-1468, f. 1 r. SAB, City Accounts, 1466-1467, f. 13 r. 
103
 Communal Florentine galleys only sailed to Flanders and Southampton between 1425 and 1478 and most of 
the ships called at Sluys only briefly. Because of the unpopularity of the mariners’ service and their frequent 
desertion, patrons were very reluctant to let their men go ashore. A Florentine scribe or notary still managed to 
break the staple laws in 1470. As no communal voyages westward have been recorded during that year, he must 
have belonged to the crew aboard the Burgundian galleys privately leased by the Florentine Medici company and 
its manager Tommaso Portinari, caught acting against the staple himself five years later, which were temporarily 
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Europe. Bearing in mind the number of black marketeers from other neighbouring regions, 
most notably Holland, it is surprising that only 3.9 percent of those caught in the period from 
1400 to 1411 originated from Brabant. This diminished even further to 1.7 percent between 
1450 and 1479, possibly because of the development of Antwerp as a hotspot of international 
trade in its own right.
104
 The acts of piracy discussed in the Genoese case also resulted in the 
complete absence of Catalans after 1450
105
 and the temporary disappearance of Castilians 
from 1456 to 1460.
106
 Even so, the total Castilian share in the number of offenses against the 
staple rose from 1.6 percent during the first period to 3.5 percent between 1450 and 1479. 
Although the Castilians primarily imported wine and Basque or Galician iron to Sluys, this 
increase must be related to the boom of Castilian merino wool on the Bruges market.
107
 One 
infringer fell under the responsibility of the Biscayan merchant guild, seceded from the 
Castilian nation in 1455.
108
 
 
The Portuguese, on the contrary, sold considerable amounts of wine and Lenten fruits such as 
raisins and figs during the first decade of the fifteenth century but saw their involvement in 
the evasion of the staple drop from 4.7 to 2.3 percent of the infractions after 1450. Besides, 
again, the privateering and the granting of new privileges, bringing about more commercial 
freedom and less need to break the rules,
109
 the changing nature of Portuguese trade was 
arguably the prime reason for this decline. The great geographical discoveries in the second 
                                                                                                                                                        
galley trade with Flanders, see W.B. Watson, ‘The Structure of the Florentine Galley Trade with Flanders and 
England in the Fifteenth Century’, Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, 39 (1961), 4, 1073-1091. W.B. 
Watson, ‘The Structure of the Florentine Galley Trade with Flanders and England in the Fifteenth Century (2nd 
part)’, Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, 40 (1962), 2, 317-347. For their recruitment and backgrounds of 
its crews, see M.E. Mallett, The Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century (Oxford, 1967), 55-57. For the 
infringing scribe, see ADN, B 6147, Account Water Bailiff 1470-1471, f. 1 v. For the Medici galleys, see 
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half of the fifteenth century laid the foundation for the Portuguese commercial expansion, but 
also made many commodities subject to a royal monopoly,
110
 making them less suited for 
illicit trade. Also declining was the English share in the staple evasions, from 5.5 percent to 
3.5 percent. Given the constant political turmoil jeopardizing Anglo-Flemish commercial 
relations throughout the fifteenth century,
111
 the drop in the number of English, still prominent 
in both formal and informal trading activities in fourteenth-century Bruges,
112
 is only a 
moderate one.
113
 Their Scottish neighbours were responsible for 3.9 percent of the entries in 
the bailiff accounts between 1400 and 1411 by illegally marketing their cloth in Sluys. They 
continued to do so until dissatisfaction with their treatment by the Bruges authorities made 
them decide to stay away from the city in 1467 and a package of fiscal benefits, including 
exemption from the congé tax, was offered in an attempt to lure them back in 1470.
114
 
 
Remarkably absent from the records in the first period and only very modestly represented 
during the second (2.3 percent) is the Hanseatic League, one of the pillars of Bruges’ 
international trade. The German Hansa used the adhesion to the Bruges staple market as an 
instrument for political bargaining: any reluctance to compensate violations of existing 
privileges or grant new ones was responded with a withdrawal of its Kontor, one of which, 
between 1451 and 1457, fell directly in the middle of the period under consideration.
115
 
Realising that the compulsory passage of all goods bound for or coming from Hanseatic 
territories through Bruges was the only option to prevent external competitors, mainly 
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Holland, from importing cloth to the Baltic and to sideline internal rivals less prominent in 
Flanders such as Cologne, the leading Hanseatic cities, Lübeck up front, always backed 
down.
116
 Still, the Ventegut, the commodities they were allowed to sell freely, left the 
Oosterlingen, as their merchants were called, with more possibilities for conducting trade in 
Sluys legitimately than their counterparts.
117
 Even though this resulted in them not being fined 
and recorded in the sources, the goods they provided were often sold on illegitimately by 
others.
118
 This suggests that loosening the regulation of formal trade for only one group of 
traders would not automatically reduce overall informal activities, on the contrary. 
 
As it is the essence of informal trade that it went unrecorded in the official statistics, it is hard, 
if not impossible to quantify its extent in Sluys. No sources other than the water bailiff 
accounts and, in case of legal proceedings, the Bruges registers of civil justice and cartularies, 
inform us on the illicit business in the port town. Still, it seems likely that the infringements 
sanctioned by the ducal officers were only the thin end of the wedge. Responsible for the 
enforcement of ducal authority on the water of the Zwin mouth and on the quays of the Sluys 
harbour, the water bailiff covered a jurisdiction that was far more extensive than that of any of 
his urban colleagues in Flanders. Within this area, the detection of staple and congé offences 
was only one of his many tasks, responsible for no more than eighteen percent of his average 
revenues both between 1400 and 1411 and 1450 and 1479.
119
 The water bailiff had to make 
sure that law and order were respected in the harbour. Additionally, he dealt with any criminal 
activity that had taken place on the ships during their journey to Sluys. He authorized the 
arrival and the departure of all vessels in the port and claimed the shipwrecks washed up on 
the Zwin shores for the duke.
120
 
 
Whereas, in the case of the congé, the receipts provided upon payment could still be checked, 
the only option to discover staple infringements was to catch perpetrators in the act of making 
an illicit transaction. Even though the water bailiff could rely on a clerk and several sergeants 
and was able to hire the services of shipmasters to go on the water, it must be clear that 
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complete coverage was an illusion in a place where, in 1457, over 110 ships had moored and 
an estimated 1,200 traders from outside the town were flocking together.
121
 All of these 
considerations are also based on the assumption that it was in the officers’ interests to track 
down staple offences, which, as will be shown further, was not always the case. Laurence le 
Moor, a Sluys local, probably judged the situation quite accurately in 1406. Stopped for 
selling barrels of ashes, he made the excuse that ‘several others in the past had done it without 
having been made to account by anyone, so if they had taken something it would never have 
been known by the said water bailiff nor by those supposed to look after the rights of our lord 
and the said city’.122 Le Moor considered the chances of being caught that low that he tried 
again with pieces of bacon the following year.
123
 The low probability of detection must have 
encouraged those for whom informal activities were no necessity to trade against the staple 
and make a handsome profit anyway. 
 
That the enforcement of the staple rules cannot have been that watertight is finally suggested 
by the fact that, despite the very stringent restrictions they imposed, Sluys only continued to 
grow. In 1469, on the eve of the havoc wreaked by the Flemish Revolt of 1477-1492, Sluys 
had over 9,700 inhabitants and ranked as the fourth city in the county.
124
 Illicit trade might 
have been a reality for only part of them, yet it should be understood that this was not a place 
that willingly acquiesced in the economic holdup committed by the Bruges commercial elites. 
 
Ignorance, powerful friends and criminal networks or how to evade the staple rules 
 
The records of the cases made by the water bailiff or the aldermen allow us to reconstruct 
various strategies used by the infringers either to mislead the authorities or, in case of arrest, 
to arouse their sympathy. Although it is impossible to determine to which extent the 
explanations given by the accused were sincere, the repetition of some procedures, several of 
which were characteristic to certain groups, suggest that these served as an excuse to cover up 
more malicious intentions.  
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One of the more rudimentary and most frequently used tactics, certainly by foreigners, was to 
pretend that they were not aware of the staple system, or some of its aspects.
125
 The staple 
privileges were extremely complex and were subject to constant change. More than once, 
Bruges had been accused by the other Members of Flanders or by Sluys of deliberately 
keeping the regulations vague and interpreting them to its own advantage.
126
 The bailiff 
accounts show that this complexity cut both ways and was abused by the black marketeers as 
well, often to no avail. That Luis Bembo would not have known he had to pay congé on his 
bundle of silk after fifteen years of regular commercial activities in the county must have 
raised even the most gullible officer’s eyebrows.127 Somewhat more convincing was to argue 
that the staple commodities, most commonly victuals, raw materials or small quantities of 
high value-added products, had been bought for personal use or for that of a relative, and were 
not in any case for resale.
128
 Both arguments sufficed for the water bailiff to allow the 
infringers to get away with a ‘composition’. 
 
Another option was to put the blame on assistants,
129
 other merchants,
130
 hostellers
131
 or even 
the ducal officers.
132
 However, most of these excuses were not accepted without further 
investigation. In 1450, the Genoese Nicolao della Costa and Georges de Sauvignon appeared 
in court because some goods imported into Sluys on their ship had been unloaded and 
transported to Zeeland. After the accused had claimed that the vessel had been emptied on the 
initiative of Melchior Gentile, the captain of the carrack, an inquiry was set up by Jacques 
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Reingot, the Bruges representative in the Zwin port. He was able to prove that the ship used 
for carrying the commodities abroad had been sent to Sluys by della Costa and Sauvignon 
themselves, who were fined a heavy £200 par.
133
 
 
A subtle way in which the rules could be evaded was to bring to the staple or the congé only 
part of the freight. The Scotsman Robert Fitzthomas was penalised in 1403 for having paid 
taxes for 15 ells of cloth while he had imported 24.
134
 Even more inventiveness was involved 
in the fraud with portage goods, the limited amount of commodities foreign seamen were 
allowed to bring along and to sell freely after registering them with the water bailiff.
135
 
Swindlers presented merchandise as portage while it was not,
136
 offered portage goods 
without registration
137
 or registered their stock against the names of others because they 
themselves were not entitled to sell portage commodities.
138
  
 
The Venetians in particular were experts in adapting the portage rules to their own needs. In 
1446, after Bruges had tolerated their infringements for years, the water bailiff and the city’s 
staple representative thought they had gone far enough and sued the Venetian merchant guild 
for large-scale violation of the portage arrangements. No solution was reached, as the 
Venetian consul was able to convince the aldermen that he and his colleague merchants were 
in no way responsible for the objectionable behaviour of the galley crews in Sluys.
139
 In 1479 
the Bruges authorities even decided to farm the office of the water bailiff’s clerk, charged 
with the registration of portage goods, themselves, outraged as they were about the liberal 
interpretation of the portage concept.
140
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Although most offenders did not belong to influential economic or political networks, some of 
them were able to avoid costly fines by calling on the aid of powerful friends and relatives. 
Most enlightening with respect to the staple debate is the use of hostellers, as it was in their 
interests that staple privileges were faithfully respected, at least if they were active in Bruges. 
Throughout the fifteenth century, the Bruges craft guilds repeatedly denounced activities and 
investments by Bruges citizens in Sluys.
141
 Could their implicit allegations of economic 
collaboration have been provoked by double-dealing hostellers?
142
 The bailiff accounts, the 
cartularies and the Civiele Sententiën contain several cases in which innkeepers obtained 
advantageous ‘compositions’ for their smuggler guests, but unfortunately do not record the 
hostels’ locations.143 Others intervening in the offenders’ favour were their hometown 
bailiff
144
 or city council.
145
 Particularly Ghent attached much importance to the legal 
protection of its citizens.
146
 Some offenders managed to get a more advantageous settlement 
thanks to bastard members of the Flemish nobility.
147
 The most impressive example of 
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intervention occurred in 1404 on behalf of Robert de Wisque from Aire-sur-la-Lys, whose 
fine was remitted on the order of the duchess of Burgundy.
148
 
 
Following a less rigid distribution of commercial space than the places where the bulk of 
retail in Bruges occurred,
149
 commercial exchange in Sluys burgeoned in the periphery of 
urban jurisdiction. The physical landscape of the Zwin region, a network of numerous hidden 
and less-hidden creeks shaped during centuries of floods and land reclamations
150
 and 
difficult to monitor for anyone who wanted to exercise control, also provided the ideal 
environment for informal trading.
151
 The most decisive stimulus to break the staple rules must 
have been the proximity of buyers and sellers, facilitating more direct contacts between 
merchants from various foreign nations on the one hand, and between foreigners and local 
people on the other than the heavily institutionalised and brokered trade conducted in Bruges. 
Sometimes these encounters gave rise to specific black marketeering networks, in which those 
involved, usually voluntary offenders, made a very sophisticated use of their legal identities. 
Particularly popular as smuggling partners were the Oosterlingen, given the many staple 
exemptions enjoyed by the Hanseatic League. Here too, a selective loosening of the staple 
restrictions reduced the need to trade informally for one group but created loopholes that 
encouraged others to break the rules. 
 
One of the networks abusing the Hanseatic privileges was the one including the Sluyzenaar 
Pieter Pijk and the Brugeois Berthelmi Sniwel and Jehan de Cleyhem, active in the carrying 
trade between Flanders and Portugal.
152
 With the intention of avoiding the costly staple 
restrictions, de Cleyhem made his wife conclude a partnership with Ghiselbrecht van Inghene 
from Kampen, Sniwel collaborated with Wouter Johansson, another Oosterling, and Pijk sold 
his goods himself on the Sluys market. As the Hanseatic exemptions only applied to 
Hanseatic merchants and not to their partners, each of them was arrested between 1402 and 
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1405.
153
 This did not prevent many others from trying to work ‘under the Hanseatic franchise’ 
during the first decades of the fifteenth century.
154
 
 
A strategy which, for obvious reasons, never made it into the bailiff accounts, was that 
involving the ducal officers. Looking at the number of complaints made by the Brugeois in 
the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, fraudulent bailiffs were not uncommon in 
Sluys.
155
 Already in 1358, the Flemish count threatened to suspend the water bailiff and his 
sergeants for a year if they did not respect the staple privileges.
156
 In 1384, Burgundian duke 
Philip the Bold had to instruct his officers again to take their commitment to the staple more 
seriously.
157
 Throughout the fifteenth century, the Members of Flanders repeatedly addressed 
the problem of water bailiffs who did not take action against illicit traders.
158
 The Borromei 
ledgers disclose that tips could go a long way toward having the water bailiff of Arnemuiden 
turn a blind eye at the tollbooth.
159
 Was his colleague in Sluys equally inclined to venality? 
He was certainly singled out in the articles that addressed extortion by ducal officers in the 
Flemish Privileges of 1477.
160
 To prevent abuses, the central authorities forbade Sluyzenaars 
to become water bailiffs in 1441.
161
 Similar evidence accusing the Bruges aldermen of 
corruption or favouritism is not available, on the contrary. In several cases the urban part of 
the fines imposed on foreign offenders was remitted because they pretended ignorance, while 
Bruges citizens who had committed similar offences were always obliged to pay the full 
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sum.
162
 This treatment fits in with the city’s compliant policy towards the foreign merchant 
communities, preferring cooperation and compromise over commercial conflicts.
163
 
 
The last resort for avoiding the bailiff’s punishment when all other possibilities had been 
exhausted was demonstrated by a nameless Gascon in 1451. Having brought goods from 
England to Sluys without going to the staple in Bruges, the fear of sanctions made him leave 
his ship in the Zwin harbour and flee.
164
 
 
Conclusions: Falling out of the Cradle of Capitalism 
 
Over the past hundred years, historians have christened late medieval Bruges a Medieval 
World Market,
165
 a gateway to international trade
166
 and the Cradle of Capitalism.
167
 Their 
epithets eloquently evoke the status of a place whose business opportunities and turnover of 
trade went unrivalled in Western Europe north of the Alps, but fail to do justice to the whole 
story of commercial hustle and bustle in and around the city. Bruges’ role as a depot for goods 
from all across Europe, securely buttressed by the staple system, has acted as a gateway to 
lucrative trading possibilities for thousands of merchants, but at the same time locked the door 
to many others interested. The water bailiff accounts, the Civiele Sententiën and the Bruges 
cartularies reveal that a considerable amount of those lacking the necessary capital and others 
who fell out of the Cradle of Capitalism resorted to illicit methods to benefit from the city’s 
economic position. Together with a minority of professional smugglers, Flemish fishermen, 
Breton carrying-traders or Venetian seamen developed a range of strategies to avoid the costly 
staple mechanisms that dominated Bruges’ international trade. Confirming, but also 
complementing and challenging the trends occurring in the centre of business frenzy, their 
desire to have their share in the city’s economic success led to the creation of an alternative 
commercial circuit on the margins of Bruges’ world market, which continued to entice traders 
throughout the fifteenth century. 
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